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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case 1
Police stopped Carmen Martinez based on a report that she had been driving erratically.
Body camera video from that stop shows Ms. Martinez behaving strangely-as if she were under
the influence of alcohol or drugs. Eventually, her car was searched and methamphetamine and a
glass pipe were discovered inside the vehicle. She was charged with felony possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine), misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, and
misdemeanor reckless driving.
The day before trial was set to begin, the State gave notice of its intent to offer bad-act
evidence under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b ), including the body camera videos depicting
Ms. Martinez in a seemingly-intoxicated state. The next day, the defense objected to the State's
late notice under Rule 404(b). Ultimately, however, the district court ruled the body camera
evidence admissible, reasoning that the notice requirement of Rule 404(b) did not apply because
evidence of Ms. Martinez's seemingly-intoxicated state did not fall within the scope of Rule
404(b).
At the conclusion of her jury trial, Ms. Martinez was found guilty of all counts. On
appeal, she contends the district court erred in admitting the body camera footage, as evidence of
her appearing drunk or high during the traffic stop was undoubtedly bad-act evidence within the
meaning of Rule 404(b ), and the State failed to give timely notice under that Rule.

1

Although this is a consolidated appeal, Ms. Martinez's description of the nature of the case
relates solely to Case No. 46894. That is because Ms. Martinez is not asserting any claims of
error associated with Case No. 46995.

1

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Early one Saturday morning in May 2018, a citizen called in a report of a driver (who
turned out to be Carmen Martinez) driving erratically-weaving all over the road and, at times,
failing to yield when she should have. (See, e.g., Tr., p.149, Ls.6-16, p.150, Ls.3-7, p.150, L.20
- p.151, L.1, p.151, L.25 - p.152, L.4, p.152, L.16 - p.153, L.14, p.154, Ls.2-6, p.155, Ls.3-7,
p.157, Ls.6-13, p.157, L.22 - p.158, L.3, p.176, Ls.13-14.) That citizen followed Ms. Martinez
from western Ada County into Canyon County, while speaking to police dispatchers and using
her horn to warn off other drivers. (See, e.g., Tr., p.151, Ls.5-7, p.155, Ls.5-9, p.159, Ls.13-15,
p.168, Ls.15-19.) Eventually, police effectuated a traffic stop in a Jackson's parking lot off of
Northside Boulevard in Nampa. (Tr., p.192, Ls.17-22.)
When first contacted by Officer Rodney Herman, Ms. Martinez seemed oblivious to her
poor driving, and assumed she was stopped for failing to properly negotiate a tum right near the
Jackson's. (See Ex. 1 at 0:31 - 0:46; Ex. 2 at 0:00 - 0:45, 1:50 - 2: 12.)2 She was fidgety,
inarticulate, and unfocused; she appeared scattered in her thoughts; her speech sounded odd and
her mouth movements appeared exaggerated; and she gesticulated excessively with an unlit
cigarette. (See Ex. 1 at 0:31 - 0:46; Ex. 2 at 0:00- 2:19.) Based on her demeanor, coupled with
her reported driving pattern, Officer Herman initially suspected "something could be wrong with
her and that might be causing the erratic driving behavior." (Tr., p.194, Ls.17-20.) Specifically,
he initially thought Ms. Martinez might have been under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol.
(Tr., p.208, Ls.12-15.) However, those suspicions were dispelled as Officer Herman continued
speaking with Ms. Martinez, as he determined she was not under the influence of anything, and
he discontinued his DUI investigation. (Tr., p.210, L.18 - p.211, L.5, p.212, Ls.15-18.) At trial,

2

Exhibits 1 and 2 are two different portions of the same audio/video recording of the stop. They
are both taken from Officer Herman's body camera.
2

Officer Herman acknowledged that the behavior observed from Ms. Martinez-confusion,
jitteriness/fidgetiness, and incoherence, were consistent with things he had seen in dealing with
individuals with mental illness. (Tr., p.213, Ls.6-21.) He also acknowledged that Ms. Martinez
indicated she took medication for mental illness. (Tr., p.213, Ls.22-24.)
During the course of the traffic stop, a canine handler, Robert Friedli, arrived with his
drug detection dog, Yager. (Tr., p.231, L.25 - p.232, L.16, p.237, L.16 - p.238, L.2.) When
Yager was run around Ms. Martinez's car, he alerted.
Thereafter, Deputy Friedli searched the car.

(Tr., p.239, L.15 - p.241, L.24.)

(Tr., p.243, Ls.12-13.)

He found suspected

methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia (a broken glass pipe) in a small bag in the passenger
compartment. (Tr., p.243, L.16 - p.244, L.8, p.250, Ls.9-22.)

Ms. Martinez was arrested and

ultimately charged in Canyon County Case No. CR14-18-9128 with felony possession of a
controlled substance, misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, and misdemeanor reckless
driving. 3 (See R. Vol. I, pp.47-49.)
Just before noon on the day before Ms. Martinez's trial, the State filed notice of its intent
to offer bad-act evidence under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b). (Aug., pp.1-5.) The bad-act
evidence included officers' body camera recordings depicting Ms. Martinez "repeatedly licking
her lips, behaving erratically or irregularly and/or showing erratic or irregular emotion(s), and/or
showing other behavior(s) and/or physical manifestation(s) which potentially could lead one or
more jurors to speculate or conclude that Defendant uses one or more drug( s), even
methamphetamine." 4

(Aug., p.2.) The State argued this evidence was admissible to prove

3

Ms. Martinez was also initially charged with misdemeanor possession of an open container of
alcohol in a vehicle. (R. Vol. I, pp.26-28.) However, that charge was voluntarily dropped by the
prosecution prior to trial. (See R. Vol. I, pp.47-49.)
4
The State did not concede this evidence was actually bad-act evidence within the meaning of
Rule 404(b). (Aug., p.2; Tr., p.29, Ls.16-20.)
3

Ms. Martinez's knowledge of the presence of the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, as
well as her intent to use the glass pipe to inhale controlled substances. (Aug., p.3.)
The next morning, at the outset of the trial, defense counsel objected to the State's late
notice under Rule 404(b).

(Tr., p.27, Ls.15-22, p.28, Ls.3-4, p.33, L.20 - p.35, L.5.)

In

response, the prosecutor explained that the notice was filed late because he was working on
redacting the officers' body camera videos the weekend before trial, and he realized on Sunday
night that some of his anticipated evidence could be construed as bad-act evidence under Rule
404(b ). 5 (See Tr., p.28, L.8 - p.31, L.4.) He also tried to blame the defense for his own late
disclosure by suggesting that defense counsel had a duty to speak up before receiving the State's
Rule 404(b) notice. (See Tr., p.32, L.21 -p.33, L5.)
The prosecutor then went on to change his argument as to why the evidence concerning
Ms. Martinez's demeanor was admissible. The prosecutor specifically disclaimed any intent to
use Ms. Martinez' demeanor to show she was under the influence of drugs. (Tr., p.33, Ls.10-18
("I'm not intending to try and make a connection between her behavior and drug use. Okay. I'm
not trying to do that. . . . I just recognize those facts could come out. It could-some jurors
could speculate on that and draw conclusions.").) Instead, the prosecutor argued, evidence of
Ms. Martinez' demeanor was admissible because those are "just facts as they exist to the officers
that [the] State is not really required to go without in a trial. And by that I mean behavior of a
defendant." (Tr., p.29, Ls.20-23.) Nevertheless, the prosecutor recognized that the jury could
view the evidence of Ms. Martinez's demeanor as depicted on the body camera videos "and say:
Oh, she's totally a meth user. She's guilty." (Tr., p.29, L.24 - p.30, L.11; accord Tr., p.33,
Ls.15-18.)
5

The State's notice was filed the next day-Monday, October 1, 2018 (see Aug., p.1)-and the
trial began on Tuesday, October 2, 2018 (see Tr., p.6, L.2).
4

Ultimately, the district court ruled that the body camera evidence depicting
Ms. Martinez's demeanor was admissible. (Tr., p.37, Ls.3-13.) This ruling seems to have been
based on two theories: first, the theory the State had just abandoned, i.e. , that evidence
suggesting Ms. Martinez was under the influence showed her knowledge and intent; second, the
idea that the evidence was res gestae. (See Tr., p.37, Ls.3-13.) Specifically, the court ruled as
follows:
Well, that's part of the stop, part of the situation the officers were faced
with, part of legitimate evidence in trial, especially as it appears defendant is
claiming that she did not know drugs were in the car. They were not her drugs,
that that's the defense. I think that evidence is relevant on that. Plus it's just part
of the whole facts of the stop and what led to the drug dog being brought in and
discovery of the other evidence anyway. So I think it's essential and has real
probative value.
(Tr., p.37, Ls.3-13.) The court did not initially address the defense argument as to the late filing
of the State's notice. (See Tr., p.37, Ls.3-13.) However, after defense counsel inquired whether
the court's ruling meant the State's notice was being considered timely, the district court
explained as follows:
evidence.

"Well, what he [the prosecutor] wants admitted is not really 404(b)

That's the Court's decision.

It's allowed outside of the requirement of 404(b )."

(Tr., p.38, Ls.6-9.)
During the trial itself, the State offered, and the district court admitted, Exhibits 1 and 2,
two different video clips from Officer Herman's body camera video. (Tr., p.196, L.9 - p.197,
L.22.) As alluded to above, these videos showed that during the traffic stop, Ms. Martinez was
fidgety, inarticulate, and unfocused; she appeared scattered in her thoughts; her speech sounded
odd and her mouth movements appeared exaggerated; and she gesticulated excessively with an
unlit cigarette. (See Ex. 1 at 0:31 - 0:46; Ex. 2 at 0:00 - 2: 19.)

5

Ultimately, the jury found Ms. Martinez guilty of all counts.

(R. Vol. I, pp. 72-73;

Tr., p.462, L.I0-p.463, L.13.) Thereafter, she was continued on bond pending preparation of a
pre-sentence investigation report and her actual sentencing. (See Tr., p.465, L.8 - p.466, L.14.)
Prior to Ms. Martinez's sentencing hearing, she incurred new criminal charges.

In

Canyon County Case No. CR14-18-24656, she was charged with three offenses: felony
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), misdemeanor possession of a
controlled substance (MDMA), and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. (R. Vol. II,
pp.11-13.)

She was also charged with a sentencing enhancement under I.C. § 37-2739 for

having had a prior drug-related conviction. (R. Vol. II, pp. I 1, 12.)
In short order, Ms. Martinez entered into a plea agreement in the new case. Under the
terms of that agreement, Ms. Martinez agreed to enter an Alford plea6 to the felony possession of
a controlled substance charge. (R. Vol. II, p.31.) In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the
misdemeanors and the sentencing enhancement, and to recommend probation, with a probation
condition that Ms. Martinez complete mental health court; it also agreed to recommend that any
underlying prison sentence be concurrent with the sentence in the earlier case. (R. Vol. II, p.31.)
Pursuant to the terms of the parties' agreement, Ms. Martinez did in fact plead guilty to
the felony possession charge in the new case. (Tr., p.475, L.19 - p.476, L.3.) The district court
accepted that plea (Tr., p.4 77, Ls.1-6) and later dismissed the misdemeanor charges and the
sentencing enhancement (R. Vol. II, pp.33, 34, 40).

The matter then proceeded directly to

sentencing for both cases.

6

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) ("An individual accused of crime may
voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even
ifhe is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.").
6

During sentencing, both the prosecutor and Ms. Martinez's counsel requested concurrent
sentences of five years, with two years fixed, suspended for a period of probation, one of the
conditions of which would be completion of mental health court. (Tr., p.478, L.17 - p.479, L.3,
p.479, Ls.15-20.) The district court followed the parties' joint recommendation as to the felony
possession charges.

(Tr., p.481, L.25 - p.482, L.6, p.483, Ls.4-8.)

On the remaining

misdemeanors from the first case, the district court imposed costs only. (Tr., p.484, Ls.5-16.)
The district court entered its judgment in the second case on February 26, 2019. (R. Vol. II,
pp.42-44.) It entered its judgment in the first case a few days later-on March 1, 2019. (R. Vol.
I, pp.93-95.)
No notice of appeal was filed in the second case until April 29, 2019. (R., pp.46-48.) It
was not timely from the judgment of conviction; it was only timely from an April 16, 2019 order
granting Ms. Martinez's motion to modify the terms of her probation (to allow her to complete

mental health court in either Canyon County or Ada County) (Aug., p.6). See I.AR. 14(a). This
is Supreme Court No. 46995-2019. On appeal, Ms. Martinez does not assert any claim of error
relating to Case No. 46995-2019.
However, Ms. Martinez filed a notice of appeal in the first case on March 22, 2019.
(R., pp.99-101.) That notice of appeal was timely from the judgment of conviction in that case.
See I.AR. 14(a). This is Supreme Court No. 46894-2019. In this case, Ms. Martinez contends

the district court erred by admitting bad-act evidence against her, despite the State's failure to
comply with the notice requirement of Rule 404(b ).

7

ISSUE
Did the district court err in admitting bad-act evidence against Ms. Martinez, where the State
failed to comply with the notice requirement ofldaho Rule of Evidence 404(b )?

8

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Admitting Bad-Act Evidence Against Ms. Martinez, As The State
Failed To Comply With The Notice Requirement Ofldaho Rule Of Evidence 404(b)
Under the Idaho Rules of Evidence, "Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not
admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character." I.R.E. 404(b )(1 ). "'The prejudicial effect of [character
evidence] is that it induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to have committed the
crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character.' Character evidence, therefore, takes
the jury away from their primary consideration of the guilt or innocence of the particular crime
on trial." State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009) (quoting State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510
(1978)). However, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted for purposes other
than proving a person's character, "such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." I.R.E. 404(b )(2). A trial
court's conclusion that such bad-act evidence is relevant to a proper, non-character purpose is
reviewed de nova. See State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 (2010).
If the bad-act evidence is relevant to a proper, non-character purpose, "the trial court

must engage in a balancing under I.R.E. 403 and determine whether the danger of unfair
prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence." Grist, 147 Idaho at 52.
"This balancing is committed to the discretion of the trial judge," id., and it will only be set aside
on appeal upon a showing of an abuse of that discretion, Johnson, 148 Idaho at 667.
However, before any portion of the foregoing standard for admissibility of bad-act
evidence even applies in a criminal case, the State has an obligation to first: "(A) file and serve
reasonable notice of the general nature of any such evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer
at trial; and (B) do so reasonably in advance of trial-or during trial if the court, for good cause

9

shown, excuses lack of pretrial notice." I.R.E. 404(b )(2). Where the State fails to comply with
the notice requirement, or to show "good cause" for the lack of adequate notice, it is error to
admit the bad-act evidence. State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 949-50 (Ct. App. 2012).
In this case, the State filed its Rule 404(b) notice at 11 :44 a.m., on Monday, October 1,
2018 (see Aug., pp.1-5)-less than 24 hours before Ms. Martinez's trial began (see Tr., p.6, L.2).
Defense counsel specifically objected to the lateness of the State's filing, arguing that, given his
own trial preparation, he had not even had time to review and digest the State's notice.
(Tr., p.27, Ls.15-22, p.28, Ls.3-4, p.33, L.20 - p.35, L.5.)
In ruling that the evidence at issue-which included evidence that Ms. Martinez appeared
drunk or high during her traffic stop-was admissible, the district court never evaluated whether
the State's notice was filed "reasonably in advance of trial" or whether there was "good cause" to
excuse compliance with the reasonable notice requirement. (Tr., p.37, Ls.3-13.) Instead, it
reasoned that this evidence fell outside the scope of Rule 404(b) altogether:
MR. BYBEE [Defense Counsel]: I just wanted to-so is this notice then
actually being considered timely? That's my concern.
THE COURT: Well, what [the prosecutor] wants admitted is not really
404(b) evidence.
That's the Court's decision.
It's allowed outside the
requirement of 404(b).
(Tr., p.38, Ls.3-9.)
The district court erred. Clearly, evidence showing Ms. Martinez to appear to be drunk
or high during her traffic stop is bad-act evidence within the meaning of Rule 404(b). As the
Court of Appeals explained in Whitaker, Rule 404(b) is broad, encompassing "not only 'other
crimes,' but also other 'wrongs or acts."' 152 Idaho at 948 (quoting Rule 404(b)) (emphasis
Whitaker). Thus, the Rule prohibits admission of evidence of the defendant's actions which bear

upon her character. Id. at 949. For example, in Whitaker, the Court of Appeals held that

10

evidence that the defendant had viewed pornography fell within the scope of Rule 404(b)
because "evidence of Whitaker's pornography viewing could have been perceived by a jury as
reflecting negatively on his character," and "could be used [by the State] to demonstrate poor
character." Id.
Likewise, evidence suggesting Ms. Martinez was drunk or high during the traffic stop in
this case would certainly have been perceived as reflecting negatively on her character. While
alcohol use is perfectly legal, drunk driving is not. Moreover, as Whitaker made clear, illegal
actions are not the only ones that may draw a person's character into question. Being drunk at
seven o'clock in the morning is generally frowned upon by society as a whole, and drinking
alcohol at any time may be looked down upon by certain segments of society. Additionally,
illicit drug use is always illegal in Idaho, as is driving while impaired by drugs. Thus, it is
readily apparent that evidence suggesting Ms. Martinez was drunk or high during the traffic stop
would be bad-act evidence falling within the ambit of Rule 404(b).
The State essentially admitted as much below. When it provided its Rule 404(b) notice
the day before trial, the State specifically argued that video evidence depicting "Defendant
repeatedly licking her lips, behaving erratically or irregularly and/or showing erratic or irregular
emotion(s), and/or showing other behavior(s) and/or physical manifestation(s) which potentially
could lead one or more jurors to speculate or conclude that Defendant uses one or more drug(s),
even methamphetamine" (Aug., p.2), and that such evidence is admissible to show that
Ms. Martinez knew methamphetamine and a pipe were present in her car, and that she intended
to use the pipe to ingest drugs (Aug., p.3). The next day, in open court, the prosecutor eschewed
any intent to use video evidence from the traffic stop to ask jurors to infer that Ms. Martinez was
drunk or high, but he recognized they still could do so. He argued as follows:

11

You have a drug case where the defendant is giving some what might be
termed as signs of drug use, licking the lips constantly, kind of an erratic behavior
or emotion, none of which I was trying to use an expert to say that's consistent
with a drug user. That's not the State's intent. My concern was: What would a
jury might [sic} speculate with regard to that if they see that visually on a TV? In
other words, would a-is there a juror on there that maybe has a relative or
themselves have had methamphetamine history that would look at that and say:
Oh, she's totally a meth user. She's guilty. So I started getting concerned, Judge.
(Tr., p.29, L.24-p.30, L.11 (emphasis added).) A bit later, he continued: "It's very speculative.
Because like I said, I'm not intending to try and make a connection between her behavior and
drug use. Okay. I'm not trying to do that. . . . I just recognize those facts could come out. It
could-some jurors could speculate on that and draw conclusions."

(Tr., p.33, Ls.9-17

(emphasis added).)
Moreover, the district court itself recognized that video evidencing depicting behaviors
consistent with drug use could raise the inference among jurors that Ms. Martinez was drunk or
high, and it suggested such an inference would be appropriate:
Well, that's part of the stop, part of the situation the officers were faced
with, part of legitimate evidence in trial, especially as it appears defendant is
claiming that she did not know drugs were in the car. They were not her drugs,
that that's the defense. I think that evidence is relevant on that. Plus it's just part
of the whole facts of the stop and what led to the drug dog being brought in and
discovery of the other evidence anyway. So I think it's essential and has real
probative value.
(Tr., p.37, Ls.3-13 (emphasis added).)
In light of the all of the foregoing, the district court plainly erred in ruling that video
evidence depicting Ms. Martinez behaving strangely during her traffic stop, as if under of the
influence or alcohol or drugs, was not bad-act evidence within the meaning of Rule 404(b ). It
clearly was. Accordingly, the district court erred in admitting that evidence in the face of the
defense's notice objection, without first determining that notice was given reasonably in advance
of trial, or that there was good cause excusing the State's late notice.

12

CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed above, Ms. Martinez respectfully requests that this Court vacate
her convictions in the first case, reverse the district court's order permitting the State to offer
evidence suggesting Ms. Martinez was under the influence of drugs or alcohol during her traffic
stop, and remand her case to the district court for a new trial.
DATED this 4th day of March, 2020.

/ s/ Erik R. Lehtinen
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
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